What would fix it

Article 1 of this series established the foundational fact: when a third carrier enters an Australian domestic route, the price per kilometre falls by more than half. [1,22] The government's own competition taskforce documented this. [1,22] It is not disputed. ¹

The reforms that would lower fares are therefore reforms that create the conditions for a third carrier to exist and compete, or that constrain the pricing power of airports and dominant airlines in the absence of competition. [1,7] They are documented. They are costed. Most of them have been recommended by the ACCC or the Senate or both. [6,9] What they have not been is implemented in full: the Government's December 2025 response to the Senate committee's report does not mention the committee's divestiture recommendation. [7,23]

This article examines each major reform category, what it would do, what is already in motion, and what the political obstacle is. [1,6,7,9]

01Reform 1: Fifth freedom rights and bilateral air services liberalisation

The most effective near-term reform for international routes is the one at the centre of the Qatar block story: granting international carriers fifth freedom rights, the ability to pick up and set down passengers between Australian cities on international routes. [5,9]

Qatar Airways wanted to fly Doha-Sydney-Melbourne-Doha. Under fifth freedom rights, it would also have been able to carry passengers from Sydney to Melbourne on that leg, not just international travellers beginning their journey in Doha. ⁹ This is how Dubai and Singapore have built aviation hubs: by allowing fifth freedom flying, they created markets where multiple carriers compete on each route, driving prices down systematically. ⁵

The European Union's answer to this question, its Single Aviation Market established in 1993, granted these rights between all EU member states simultaneously. ⁵ The result was the emergence of Ryanair and easyJet as transformative competitive forces. ⁵ European domestic airfares, adjusted for distance, are consistently lower than Australian equivalents. ⁵

Australia's bilateral air service agreements are restrictive on fifth freedom rights compared to open skies models. ⁹ The Senate inquiry recommended the government conduct proper cost-benefit analysis before bilateral decisions, consult the ACCC, and publish its reasons. ⁹ The Government's December 2025 response says only that the Department will continue to consult widely, including with the ACCC, on bilateral negotiations; it does not commit to a cost-benefit analysis or to publishing reasons for decisions. ²³

The Qatar-Virgin alliance, authorised by the ACCC in March 2025, is a partial implementation of the competition that fifth freedom rights would have created directly. [3,12] Virgin CEO confirmed at the alliance authorisation that competition was already producing 'increased sale activity on airfares between Australia and Europe, the Middle East and Africa.' [3,12] The evidence is live: competition lowers prices. [1,12]

Correction, 8 October 2026. The fact box in this section and the key facts gave a range as the estimated cost of 20 months of foregone Qatar competition, with a low end of A$540M a year. The range was presented as the ACCI's estimate of the cost of the block, as the series' article 3 gave it, and its low end is not in the source that article cites ³. The ACCI's estimate, as Al Jazeera reports it, is one figure: at least A$788 million a year in lost tourism, a cost to the Australian economy, not a measure of the cost of lost competition. The fact box and the key facts now say so. See the correction of the same date on The Qatar block.

Correction, 19 October 2026. The opening and this section said the reforms 'have not been implemented' and that the Senate's recommendations 'have not been implemented in any enforceable form', citing the ACCC's March 2026 release ⁷ and a Simple Flying page ⁹, neither of which examines implementation. The Government's response to the Senate committee, presented on 11 December 2025, is three pages, does not use the word divestiture, and says the Department will continue to consult widely, including with the ACCC ²³; the Senate committee's Recommendation 3 had called for a review of reform options including divestiture powers ²¹. The text now says that, with that scope. The price-per-kilometre figures are from Dr Andrew Leigh's address of 30 January 2024, which presents Treasury research by Omer Majeed and coauthors ²²; Australian Aviation's report ¹ is no longer the only citation.

02Reform 2: Slot management and use-it-or-lose-it enforcement

The replacement of the Qantas-Virgin joint venture slot manager at Sydney Airport with the independent Airport Coordination Limited in April 2025 is the most significant structural aviation reform of recent years. ² It addresses one of the five structural barriers to entry identified in Article 2. ²

AirInsight reported that under ACL's management airlines would face stricter use-it-or-lose-it enforcement, real-time slot usage tracking, and published slot data. ² The Government's own response says the 2024 amendments enhance compliance and enforcement for slot misuse. ²³ If an airline cannot use its peak-hour slots at the level of utilisation expected at comparable international airports, it risks losing them. ² This creates genuine space for new entrants to access Sydney's most valuable flying windows. ²

What remains insufficient: the 80/20 rule, which allows cancellation of 20 per cent of flights without forfeiting slots, was retained in the 2024 reforms. [17,18] Sydney Airport itself had urged a much stricter 95/5 rule, under which an airline must use a slot at least 95 per cent of the time to keep it. ¹⁹ The reform is genuine. The implementation is conservative. ²

This outlet's recommendation: the government should tighten the 80/20 rule toward the 95/5 standard Sydney Airport has itself proposed ¹⁹, with independent ACCC review of whether slot reallocation is producing measurable new entry.

Correction, 7 October 2026. This section said aviation analysts argued for a stricter 85/15 or 90/10 slot rule; no source for those figures could be found, and the reference cited did not carry them. It now reports the documented proposal: Sydney Airport's call for a 95/5 rule. ¹⁹ The retention of the 80/20 rule in the 2024 reforms is now cited to the Parliamentary Library Bills Digest and Australian Aviation. [17,18]

Correction, 8 October 2026. The recommendation in this section called for moving the 80/20 rule to 85/15 within two years, citing references 2 and 6, which carry no such figure. It is now marked as this outlet's own recommendation, points to the 95/5 rule Sydney Airport proposed ¹⁹ instead of an unsourced 85/15 figure, and no longer carries a two-year deadline or the citations that did not support it.

Correction, 19 October 2026. This section and the brief described the new Sydney slot arrangement as having 'stricter use-it-or-lose-it enforcement', on AirInsight's account ². What the record carries is that the Minister appointed Airport Coordination Limited APAC as Slot Manager from 1 April 2025 ²³, that the ACCC expects it to better ensure airlines do not hold more slots than they need ²⁴, and that the 2024 amendments enhance compliance and enforcement for slot misuse ²³. AirInsight's account of stricter enforcement is now attributed to it. That the reform is genuine but partial is this outlet's reading.

03Reform 3: Airport re-regulation

The ACCC has recommended mandatory and enforceable aeronautical pricing principles, and reiterated that view in its airport monitoring report for 2023-24, published in March 2025. [6,25] Former ACCC chair Allan Fels, in a report commissioned by the ACTU, identified a 'very strong case' for the introduction of price regulation of airports, as Australian Aviation reported. ⁶ Airlines for Australia and New Zealand called the current monitoring regime 'not fit for purpose.' ⁶ The airports earned EBITDA margins of up to 82 per cent and returns on aeronautical assets above 20 per cent. ⁶

The ACCC's March 2026 airport monitoring report warned that A$20 billion in planned infrastructure investment would likely produce higher charges flowing through to passengers. ⁶ It recommended, again, that pricing principles be made mandatory and that dispute resolution mechanisms be introduced. ⁶

What this means in practice: when an airport proposes to charge airlines A$X per landing, airlines should have access to an independent arbitration process rather than simply accepting the airport's terms or withdrawing from the airport entirely. ⁶ This is how the UK's Competition and Markets Authority regulates Heathrow. ⁵ It is not radical. It is standard. ⁶

The Western Sydney International Airport, opening late 2026 as a fully government-owned facility, represents an opportunity. ¹⁴ Its slot allocation, pricing structure, and access rules can be designed without the influence of the incumbents. ¹⁴ If designed correctly, with competitive access principles, slot allocation favouring new entrants, and pricing regulated from the start, WSI could be the entry point that changes the structural dynamic in Australian aviation. ¹⁴

Correction, 19 October 2026. This section said the ACCC has recommended mandatory aeronautical pricing principles 'for more than a decade'. No source read for this series shows how long; the ACCC's airport monitoring report for 2023-24 (March 2025) says it 'reiterates its view' that the Government should mandate them ²⁵. The duration is removed here, in the pull quote and in the closing section, and the pull quote now says the ACCC recommended mandatory pricing principles, not price regulation. The Fels quotation is from a report commissioned by the ACTU, as reported by Australian Aviation ⁶; the report itself was not read.

04Reform 4: Transparency and competition powers

The Senate inquiry's most structurally significant recommendation, largely overlooked, was the call for divestiture powers. ⁴

Former ACCC chair Allan Fels told the inquiry he was 'strongly in favour' of a divestiture power. ⁴ In the committee's report he gave as his Qantas example the separation of domestic from international. ²¹ Canberra Airport's submission argued for Qantas no longer owning Jetstar. ²¹

The logic: Jetstar is the mechanism through which Qantas occupies both the premium and budget segments of the domestic market simultaneously. [4,7] A standalone Jetstar, competing independently for passengers and no longer able to coordinate with Qantas on capacity decisions, would immediately restructure the domestic market. ⁴ The threat of divestiture, even if never exercised, would change the incentives of both airlines. ⁴

A specific ACCC investigation into Qantas's market conduct, as recommended by the Senate inquiry, would create the evidentiary basis for whatever structural intervention the market ultimately requires. ⁴ The monitoring direction that the Treasurer issued in 2023 runs only to December 2026. ⁷ It should be made permanent. ⁷

Correction, 16 October 2026. This section and the brief said Allan Fels told the Senate inquiry he was 'strongly in favour' of giving the ACCC power to require Qantas to divest Jetstar. The committee's report (paragraph 3.18) records him as strongly in favour of a divestiture power; the Qantas break-up he gave as an example was 'the separation of domestic from international'. The separation of Jetstar from Qantas was the proposal of Canberra Airport's submission (paragraph 3.21). The text now says so, and the committee report is added as reference 21.

05Reform 5: Political integrity

On the transparency side of this reform category, independent senator David Pocock says the major parties have resisted every crossbench push. ⁸

The Chairman's Lounge model, documented in Article 4, works because it is legal. ⁸ Upgrades are declared. No law is broken. ⁸ The system produces a structurally corrupted decision-making environment without requiring any individual act of corruption. ⁸

The fix is simple: prohibit politicians and ministers from accepting any benefits from regulated industries above standard commercial entitlements. ⁸ An economy-class seat from Qantas, booked and paid for normally, is a standard commercial entitlement. ⁸ A Chairman's Lounge membership, a personal relationship with the CEO, and a guaranteed upgrade whenever the minister chooses to fly is not. ⁸

Independent senator David Pocock told InDaily that every time the crossbench in the Senate pushes on more lobbying transparency and ministerial diaries, the major parties team up and defeat the motion or bill. ⁸ InDaily does not report any crossbench motion or bill to ban perks, upgrades or Chairman's Lounge access, or any vote on one.

More broadly: bilateral air service decisions should be subject to mandatory cost-benefit analysis, ACCC consultation, and publication of reasons, as the Senate recommended. ⁹ The Qatar block occurred because none of these requirements existed. ⁹ A future transport minister should not be able to block a competitor's application, on behalf of a dominant incumbent, without any of these requirements applying. ⁹

In 2023, Professor Rod Sims told a Senate inquiry that the company allocating Sydney Airport's slots was, to his understanding, majority owned by Qantas and Virgin. The Prime Minister whose government blocked Qatar in 2023 had declared at least 22 Qantas upgrades, according to Joe Aston's book. The ACCC has recommended mandatory airport pricing principles. None of this required any law to be broken. Fixing it requires laws, not just better behaviour.

Correction, 15 October 2026. This section, and the brief point drawn from it, said that every time the crossbench moved to ban industry perks for politicians, the major parties voted it down, and that the major parties had consistently refused to consider this category of reform. The InDaily article cited ⁸ does not say that. It reports David Pocock, the independent senator for the ACT, saying that every time the crossbench in the Senate pushes on more lobbying transparency and ministerial diaries, the major parties team up and defeat the motion or bill. It reports no motion or bill to ban perks, upgrades or Chairman's Lounge access, and gives no vote details. Joe Aston's remark above is his opinion, not a motion. The section and the brief now describe what Pocock said: that the major parties resist lobbying transparency. The blockquote attributed to Joe Aston, "It is probably time for free upgrades for MPs to be banned", was cited to the InDaily article ⁸, which does not contain it. The words are in The Nightly's interview with Aston ²⁰, but there they are the reporter's paraphrase ("He said it was probably time for free upgrades for MPs to be banned"), not a verbatim quote. The blockquote now carries Aston's direct words from that interview: "Why would any company be sponsoring the holidays of politicians? I don't see how it's right." He said it was probably time for free upgrades for MPs to be banned, as The Nightly reports.

Correction, 19 October 2026. The pull quote and the timeline in this section said the Qantas-Virgin joint venture managed Sydney Airport's slots from 1997 to 2025, that the Prime Minister had declared upgrades on about 22 personal Qantas flights, and that the ACCC had recommended airport price regulation for over a decade. The ownership of the slot manager in 1997 is not established, the 22 figure is Joe Aston's count as reported by The Nightly, and the ACCC recommends mandatory pricing principles, not price regulation. The pull quote, the timeline, the key facts, the closing section and the reference now say so (the pull quote now reports Professor Rod Sims's evidence to the Senate inquiry on the ownership ²¹); see the corrections in the articles on the duopoly and on the politicians.

06What is already working

It is worth recording what has already changed, because reform is possible and some of it has happened. [2,3,7]

Independent slot management at Sydney Airport from April 2025: a genuine structural reform. ²

Qatar-Virgin alliance producing immediate fare competition on Australia-Europe routes from June 2025. [3,12]

ACCC monitoring direction extended and quarterly reporting recommenced. ⁷

Aviation White Paper published, flagging further competition and consumer protection work. ⁷

Western Sydney International Airport under construction, government-owned, opening late 2026. ¹⁴

Aviation Customer Rights Charter introduced: partial consumer protection. ¹⁰

Each of these is genuine. [2,3,7,14] None is sufficient on its own. [1,7] The structural condition documented across this series, a duopoly on almost 99 per cent of domestic flights, 16.1 per cent domestic margins, record profits, fares above pre-COVID levels, has not changed. ⁷

Correction, 7 October 2026. This section, and the key facts, said the two airline groups hold 94 to 99 per cent of the domestic market. The ACCC figure this article cites ⁷ is nearly 99 per cent of domestic flights. Both now say almost 99 per cent.

07The political obstacle

The case for reform is clear. The reforms are known. The evidence is documented. The ACCC has made the recommendations. The Senate has supported them. [1,4,6,9]

The obstacle is the same mechanism this series has documented across eight articles: an airline that has systematically cultivated relationships with the politicians who make regulatory decisions, through a legal system of access and preferential treatment that creates obligation without corruption. [8,15]

Qantas has every incentive to maintain the current architecture. ¹⁵ Its domestic margins are 16.1 per cent in a concentrated market. ¹⁵ Its Loyalty division generates A$511 million in EBIT on a business that depends on domestic pricing power. ¹⁵ Every structural reform that introduces competition reduces those margins. [1,15]

The political economy of reform is therefore asymmetric. ¹⁵ The benefits are diffuse, distributed across 25 million Australians in the form of lower fares. ¹ The costs are concentrated, absorbed by Qantas's shareholders and executives. ¹⁵ Concentrated interests are better organised to resist reform than diffuse interests are to demand it. ¹⁵

This series has been an attempt to change that. ¹ The facts of the airline rort are not complicated. The market is concentrated. The profits are high. The competition was blocked. The Prime Minister whose government blocked it had declared at least 22 Qantas upgrades on his register of interests, according to Joe Aston's book. ¹⁶ The man who lobbied for the block left the country and was never questioned. The media that should have covered the structural story had commercial relationships with the airline. [1,7,8,15]

Correction, 7 October 2026. This article said, in this paragraph, in a pull quote and in its key facts, that the transport minister who blocked Qatar Airways' application in 2023 had received 22 or more Qantas upgrades. No source this series cites supports that. The figure of about 22 declared personal upgrades, between 2009 and 2019, belongs to Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, as the series' own article on Qantas and the politicians records. ¹⁶ All three passages now say so.

The fix is: more competitors, better regulated airports, constrained ministerial discretion, banned industry gifts to politicians. [1,6,8,9] Australia has the evidence. It has the recommendations. It has an independent regulator that has been making the case, most recently in March 2025. [6,25]

What it needs is a government that will act on it.

Update, 19 October 2026. The closing section's sentence on the Prime Minister's declared upgrades now reads 'at least 22 Qantas upgrades on his register of interests, according to Joe Aston's book', and its sentence on the ACCC's case no longer gives a duration, for the reasons set out in the sections on airport re-regulation and on the pull quote.

08The Airline Rort: series complete

If it's a rort, we cover it.

Update, 7 October 2026. Reference ¹¹, which pointed to the ACCC's homepage, now points to the Department of Industry, Science and Resources page that describes the Australian Domestic Gas Security Mechanism, the agency that administers it. No sentence in this article cites it.